« The Paramilitary Dilemma: Should We Recruit Iraqi Thugs to Beat Iraqi Thugs? | Main | Ford and GM: Proof American Managers Don't Know Their Jobs? »
May 04, 2005
The Iraq War is an Arab Opportunity, but Lasting Democracy Needs a Lasting US Commitment
The Iraq War has given Arab democrats an opportunity, but it'll be up to them to seize it. And if America really wants Arab democracy, it'll take a sustained commitment, not just a one-year binge. But the short answer to Kevin Drum's question is yes, the "domino effect" is real. Crises create democrats' opportunity, and the Iraq War is a legitimacy crisis for most of the Arab leaders. Moreover, democracy breaks out when democrats realize the secret police can't just kill them all. American pro-democracy pushiness is seen by a lot of Arabs as limiting what governments like Egypt and Syria can do to shut activists down. Bush's aggressiveness against one Arab dictator has created an opportunity for other Arab democracies. But the hard part isn't getting Arab elections for this one year; the hard part is making democracy last.
We think of democracy as a purely natural development, but usually democracy breaks through when the autocrats have mishandled a crisis and lost the confidence of their backers and subordinates. That's how democracy came to Argentina, after the junta bungled the 1983 Falklands War; how it came to the Soviet Union, after the 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev left both him and his rivals impotent; that's how it happened in the Philippines, after Marcos assassinated Benigno Aquino in 1983 (though it took three years for the movements to crest and overthrow Marcos). Economic crises played a similar role in ending dictatorships in Taiwan and South Korea. And the Iraq War is certainly a crisis for the Arab autocrats, which makes it an opportunity for the Arab democrats.
The irony is that the Iraq War is a crisis for the Arab autocrats precisely because it shows them up as both vulnerable to removal and as not standing up to America. The democratic movements in Egypt and Lebanon are not pro-American movements. But ironic or not, the Iraq War makes the Arab leaders look impotent, and leaders who look impotent attract attempts to overthrow them.
But the more important contribution of the Iraq War to Arab democracy is the message it sends that Bush, unlike other Presidents, is willing to use force to make his foreign policy happen. And that means that Egypt's secret police and Syria's army are less free than they might have been to shut down protest movements. Nobody, not even the American government, knows how far America would let Egypt or Syria go to stop the democrats. But for the first time in a long time, the Arab democrats suspect that the despots' force is limited -- and that gives the Arab democrats courage.
We've seen the same "your leverage is gone" string of revolutions before, in 1989, when all the Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe flipped to democracy one after another. What changed in 1989 was not that the activists were suddenly smarter, or the dictators more hated. All that had changed was the realization that the Soviet Union was no longer going to bail the dictators out. Suddenly, there was no room for the dictators to appeal to the kind of force they were used to relying on -- and suddenly, one autocracy after another gave way to elections. When autocracies lose their flexibility to use force on their citizens, democracy breaks out. The Iraq War, combined with Bush's pro-democracy rhetoric, makes many suspect that Egypt and Syria (among others) have lost the flexibility to use force against protesters -- and that gives the democrats a chance to seize power.
But the real test is not whether we get one honest election in more Arab countries, but whether we get lasting democracy. That's much harder. Historically democracies rely for stability on a strong middle class, but the middle class of many Arab countries is atrophied. Historically democracies do better when there's a tradition of honest judges and the rule of law, and that too is not a regional strong point. The Arab countries have weak legal systems and weak economies outside oil, and that tends to be a recipe for military coups or Venezuela-style charismatic dictatorships. Arab democracy won't last unless the United States makes a continuing commitment to uphold it against the return of dictatorship.
America has a sad record of spending a few months or a year pushing for democracy in a place, then letting its attention go elsewhere just in time for the country to fall back into chaos or despotism. That's what happened in Haiti, and in many other American pro-democracy interventions in Central America in the 1900s. That's also what happened with the Palestinian Authority in the Oslo years, where the Clinton Administration accepted Arafat's one election as good enough and never pressed him for better government after. There's reason to think that if the Palestinians had had an honest democracy instead of Arafat's corrupt charismatic dictatorship, they would have been able to settle their issues peacefully with Israel, and the entire bloodshed of the last few years could have been avoided. And we see some of the same neglect today in Mexico, where the United States was largely silent as the Mexican government attempted to trump up an excuse to force out of politics the leading opposition politician. American political leaders tend to push for democracy only every now and then. That won't be enough to sustain democracy in the Arab world.
Any Arab democracy is almost certain to fall into the hands of leaders who will be tempted to recreate dictatorship. Arab democracy may start now, but it won't last -- unless the United States shows year by year that it's on the side of those who want Arab democracy to last.
So as for war as a tool for democracy: it works when and only when you can convince people you're there for the duration. Lasting American presence in Germany and Japan = lasting democracy in those countries and, over time, in other regional countries with strong ties to them. Brief involvement in Haiti = nothing achieved in Haiti or its neighbors. (And local factors still matter -- such as German wealth versus Haitian poverty. There are poor democracies, like Mali. But it's harder.)
[E1] Mudville OPL.
Posted by danielstarr at May 4, 2005 01:59 AM
Trackback Pings
TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.danielstarr.com/movabletype/mt-tb.cgi/32
Comments
As you know, Mexico is very sensitive to US intervention in internal affairs. I wonder if a stronger US statement might have not been seen as that welcome, even by the opposition? As it turns out, Fox caved in, and perhaps due to quiet diplomacy of the US and other nations, as well as rising domestic opposition. Would a tougher public line from the US have been more helpful? Hard to know... But that's a very different issue, in any case, than what you're arguing for, which is a long-term commitment to these countries.
Posted by: David Holiday ![[TypeKey Profile Page]](http://www.danielstarr.com/nav-commenters.gif)
at May 5, 2005 06:28 AM
You're right that a public American complaint might have backfired; but the news articles have been pretty vacant of the usual tokens of even behind-the-scenes American pressure. So it seems fair to conclude that the US really did take no stance, even in private, on the Obrador affair. Of course American influence might have been limited -- but I wanted to highlight how "democracy promotion" is at least currently something we do only at the very low and very high ends. That is, we give small amounts of support to democracy-building organizations like the ones involved in the Ukraine and Georgia revolutions; and every so often the President pushes on some particular country for democratic reform. But there's no sense abroad that the United States is consistently going to push against antidemocratic movements and/or reward democratic reforms.
Posted by: Daniel Starr at May 5, 2005 01:55 PM