May 08, 2005
North Korea Disarmament In Four Cold-Blooded Steps
There are things we can do about North Korea. And if North Korea is on the verge of testing a nuclear weapon, we'd better start doing them. When the history books talk about Afghanistan, they'll make Clinton sound like a total failure and Bush like a successful leader. But when the subject is North Korea it looks like it'll be the other way around, unless Bush changes his policy fast.
Under Clinton, North Korea had its reactors frozen, its missile tests on hold, and its plutonium locked up under the eyes of inspectors. Under Bush, North Korea is firing off missiles again, it's harvested six warheads' worth of plutonium now, and it's set to grab another five warheads' worth out of their reactors soon. It's true that Clinton's policy was powered by annual bribes to North Korea, and it's true that North Korea was still trying to secretly enrich uranium. (See this Naval War College Review piece and this Foreign Affairs piece for a fair look at the successes and failures of the Clinton-era deal.) But the fact remains that our current "yell loudly, but do nothing" policy toward North Korea is a miserable failure.
So how do we tame North Korea?
1. Focus at first on Iran.
2. Make America's demands firm but limited.
3. Put a long series of small carrots on the table.
4. When it's time for force, boil the frog slowly.
1. Focus at first on Iran.
North Korea already has nuclear weapons capability. Iran doesn't. Getting a country to freeze a weapons research program is easier than getting it to give up actual weapons. And Iranian leaders are much more likely than the North Koreans to be tempted into using nuclear weapons, if they do get them, to shield war or terrorism. We shouldn't trust Kim Jong-Il with nukes, but we can deal with North Korea more slowly than Iran.
Just as importantly, once we've succeeded with Iran we'll have more leverage for North Korea. If we pull off a peaceful deal with Iran, that gives us credibility and experience for making a deal with North Korea. If we use some level of force on Iran, that gives us credibility and experience for using force on North Korea. We've never had problems quite like Iran and North Korea before, and it'd be nice to learn from the easy case before we go into the home stretch on the hard one. And while our ordinary diplomats can work both countries at once, realistically the President is only going to focus serious American power on one at a time. If we get Iran right, North Korea will become much easier.
2. Make America's demands firm but limited.
Bush's biggest mistake was not that he scrapped the Clinton deal, but that he made it look like he wasn't going to accept any deal at all that left North Korea's dictator in power. That's fine if you want to keep America's hands pure, but not so fine if you want to tame North Korea without open war. If we can make deals with Egypt and Uzbekistan, and justify them on the grounds that eventually our influence in those countries is going to improve their behavior, we can do the same in North Korea.
We weren't responsible for Kim Jong-Il's mass-murdering mass-enslaving regime. Making a deal that leaves him in power doesn't suddenly make us responsible, unless we had a cheap way to remove him, which we don't. Our responsibility is just to make sure that making a deal with him leads to better things than standing back and yelling at him. And standing back and yelling at him hasn't worked at all.
If leaving Kim in power can be consistent with improving human rights there and ending the nuclear weapons program, then that's just fine. America's goal is not to feel good about having scolded a dictator; it's to feel good about how we've changed North Korea. If we can work with Musharraf in Pakistan and Hu Jintao in China -- if we can improve human rights over time even in countries that do have nuclear weapons, using the leverage of economic ties -- why can't we do that in North Korea?
So while we shouldn't settle for a fake agreement, we need to make North Korea believe that we're serious about letting Kim stay in power -- as long as he's willing to trade nukes and prison camps for other means of having money and safety.
3. Put a long series of small carrots on the table.
America and North Korea don't trust each other, and peoples that don't trust each other don't voluntarily keep the terms of "grand bargains." (Just ask the Israelis and Palestinians how well their 1993 and 1995 Oslo agreements were carried out.) But even during the height of the Cold War, America and the Soviet Union built up successful informal and formal agreements that made both countries breathe easier. America and North Korea can build up bargains the same stepwise way. If America keeps its eyes on its ultimate goals, those agreements can step up all the way to the disarmament, and maybe even the human rights reform, that we want to see.
North Korea's government wants two things: money and safety. The United States has the power to provide or destroy both. From North Korea the United States wants two things: nuclear disarmament, and the right of emigration for the masses of pseudo-political prisoners. Both of those are in North Korea's power, and even in its interest -- if only it really believes it can give those up yet keep or improve its money and safety.
In other words, there's room for a deal. North Korea does the things we hate for the pragmatic reasons of money and safety; we can give it better ways to get the money and safety the government wants. The reason there is no overall agreement is because neither side trusts each other. The reason there is no progress toward an overall agreement because neither side is offering a sweetener or a punishment to motivate the other side to test whether it can be trusted.
Right now, the United States' policy toward North Korea isn't "Big Carrot" like the Europeans' policy has been toward Serbia or Turkey; it isn't "Big Stick" like the United States' current policy toward Syria. Our current North Korea policy is "No Carrot, No Stick, Lots of Whining." North Korea's never responded to whining. But it's listened just fine to carrots. We may need the stick, too -- we'll talk about that in a moment. But let's begin with a small carrot.
The United States can ask for something small, verifiable, and symbolic, like the return of inspectors to Yongbyon or another previously inspected nuclear site. We can offer a bribe that's meaningful but reversible, like a three-month resumption of the fuel oil shipments made under the Clinton deal. And we can quietly let North Korea know that if it doesn't comply, we'll do something limited but nasty, like mining one North Korean harbor.
Then one of two things will happen: North Korea takes the small deal, or it doesn't. Suppose they do take the small deal. Then we ask for the next step, and offer to continue or mildly increase the bribe. And we keep adding on little sweeteners in trade for little requests, step by step, until we've bought what we want.
Take a moment and look towards our ultimate goal: how much would it cost to buy North Korean nuclear disarmament? A lot less than we've spent on the war in Iraq, or even on the war in Afghanistan. The ultimate outcome is if the United States makes North Korea another Egypt, a dictatorship we permanently subsidize in return for them being a good neighbor and slowly improving their human rights records. If we remember to be serious this time about insisting on the steady human rights improvement, I think spending $2 billion a year to bribe North Korea is at least as worthwhile as spending $2 billion a year to bribe Egypt. In fact, it doesn't even have to cost that much, since we can probably hold up South Korea and Japan for most of the bribes.
Now suppose North Korea doesn't take the deal -- the first deal, or the tenth, or the twentieth. Then what? We don't panic. We don't go to all-out war either. We just do one definite, reversible, escalatable thing to them.
Maybe we mine one harbor for a month.
And if that doesn't work? Then we escalate -- slowly.
4. When it's time for force, boil the frog slowly.
Saying "there are no good military options for North Korea" is as misleading as saying "there were no good military options in the Cuban missile crisis." In 1962, there was indeed no good outcome to opening the gates to war in Cuba or elsewhere. But there were ways, like the blockade that Kennedy ordered, to use military power effectively to force Russia to change its ways without making a war look like Russia's best option. There was a good way to use force against Cuba. And there are good ways to use force against North Korea.
Just as any serious war with the Soviet Union would have meant the destruction of Europe, any serious war against North Korea would mean the deaths of hundreds of thousands of South Koreans. North Korea has an ungodly number of rockets and artillery pieces aimed to fire at the South Korean capital of Seoul, just across the North-South border. In other words, North Korea holds Seoul hostage, just as Russia during the Cold War held Europe (and later America) hostage.
But that Russia held Europe hostage didn't mean America had to let Russia do whatever it wanted on Cuba. It just meant that America had to handle Cuba in a way that was limited, that left both sides with a chance to stop, so that Russia had a better choice than executing its hostage. The same is true for North Korea. In some ways America can do whatever it wants to North Korea, as long as it doesn't look like America is about to remove Kim Jong-Il himself from power.
American force against North Korea has to be ostentatiously limited, but slowly escalating, and always accompanied by a credible offer of a deal. That is, a deal that will leave Kim's government in power. As long as American force happens one step at a time, and leaves North Korea with plenty of time to decide their response; and as long as continuing failure to make a deal brings continuing steps of escalation, North Korea has both the reason and the history to lead it to take a bargain short of all-out war.
So what kind of limited force is available? As with Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 90s, there are a lot of things that would make North Korea's government miserable without immediately endangering it. America could do any of these, one at a time, in order of increasing danger to Americans:
1. Blockade North Korean waters;
2. Mine one North Korean harbor;
3. Drop one bomb on North Korea's oil pipeline;
4. Drop one bomb on a North Korean railway junction;
4. Enforce a no-fly zone over a small rural sector of North Korea;
5. Fly in an "inspection team" to examine or destroy a single site somewhere in North Korea.
All of these would be dangerous. (North Korea has air defenses, though not very good ones. And it has lots of soldiers.) All of them assume what amounts to a state of war between America and North Korea. None of them are the sort of thing Kim Jong-Il would want to last. But no one of these, happening by itself, would put Kim Jong-Il's control of North Korea in danger of falling apart in the next 72 hours.
If America drops one bomb on the oil pipeline, Kim still has his country. So what are his choices? He could agree to take the next step toward nuclear disarmament. He could wait for America to drop two bombs the week after, and three bombs the week after that. Or he could throw up his hands, declare himself doomed anyway, and bomb Seoul. Is he going to bomb Seoul? What does that get him?
Bombarding Seoul costs Kim his hostage, and means America has no reason not to nuke him any more. Of course, if Kim believes that America really will accept nothing less than his destruction, he might try killing his Southern hostages just to see if it helps save him. But if we've kept our demands "firm but limited", Kim isn't going to choose suicide. He's going to choose what every dictator has always chosen: staying in power.
People like to claim North Korea's dictator is, despite his ability in surviving and even manipulating America thus far, actually some kind of loon, a suicidal maniac, crazy. But that's an all-purpose excuse. You can use it just as well to argue that we need to nuke Pyongyang now, to prevent Kim from crazily selling weapons to American enemies. If he's crazy he may as well be too crazy to leave free as too crazy to try to tame. In fact the evidence is that North Korea's ruler is not suicidal, just in love with bluster; and not insane, just evil.
To be precise, Kim Jong-Il has never shown any signs of being any more crazy than Saddam Hussein. In fact, less crazy -- Kim actually managed a deal with Clinton, which Saddam Hussein never did. Yet even Saddam Hussein, faced with American sanctions, bombs and no-fly zones, didn't try to use his firepower. Saddam Hussein hunkered down and waited, and let America erode his military power, because his power over his own people was more important to him.
Likewise, Kim is not going to do anything to provoke America to overthrow him as long as he believes he can wait it out or make a deal. So as long as America takes only one nibble at a time, we can, if we have to, "boil the frog slowly."
We're used to instant war, but pressuring North Korea will take the opposite: protracted war, drawn-out war, war so slow that to Kim it doesn't feel like war -- just negotiations. Let's shut down North Korea's outlets for weapons export, one at a time, over a period of months. Let's shut down the fuel supplies, just as gradually. Take over the airspace -- even more gradually. (Some pilots will be shot down and captured. Is it worth it? Depends on how many civilian dead we risk if we don't take that chance.) Land checkpoint teams at odd places in the mountains, slowly. Declare no-drive zones in the northern mountains, one at a time...
...if we really wanted to, we could annex North Korea by agonizingly slow steps over a three-year period, and give Kim Jong-Il the option of cutting a deal with us from the beginning right on through to the end.
The key idea is to be slow yet avoid the mistakes of the Clinton bombing of Iraq, or the Lyndon Johnson bombing of North Vietnam, where America did token damage and then stopped and waited and then did token damage again. We want our escalation to be slow but strategic. The right escalation series is one that ultimately, slowly, leads to Kim not really controlling key portions of his country.
If we take over one grain of sand of North Korea, Kim has too much left to lose to go to war. But if he really does put off making a deal indefinitely, eventually we can add up so many grains of sand that we could actually defend ourselves and Seoul against any threat Kim could make. If that happens we won't need a deal with the dictator any more.
There's your cold-blooded take on dealing with North Korea. It's true we should have kept the Clinton deal going until we had something better ready to put in place. But just as in Cuba in 1962, we do have options for force in North Korea today. And if we put those options for force alongside Clinton-style dealmaking, we can probably get North Korea disarmed.
There's no way to just overthrow Kim Jong-Il without a lot of people getting killed. But with a big-stick, big-carrot, limited demands, slow-escalation policy, we can get everything else we need. It won't be free in money or lives; just the best of the available alternatives. Given that millions are already dead or enslaved in North Korea, and the price of a nuke sold by NK to someone else could be 300,000 Americans dead, I think the case is strong for "big stick, big carrot, limited demands, slow strategic escalation."
[E1] See also posts at Daniel Drezner (by guestblogger Suzanne Nossel), Coming Anarchy, Washington Monthly, Matthew Yglesias, The Moderate Voice, Belgravia Dispatch, and Pejmanesque, among many others.
[E2] Mudville OPL.
Posted by danielstarr at May 8, 2005 12:47 AM
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